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Part I: Introducing the Paper and the Topic 
This chapter is about the relationship between law and development. More specifically, it 
is about statutory laws and economic development. The case study will be Palestine2 after 
Oslo.3  
Statutory laws are used, in contemporary states or proto-states, as is the case with the 
Palestinian Authority (hereinafter PA),4 to effectuate change. This paper shows that 
statutory laws intend to accelerate the process of socio-economic change, both through 
deliberate processes of legal reform and through emergency responses to crisis. The 
objective of achieving development through legal reform, however, does not necessarily 
hold. On the contrary, as shall be proven by the Palestinian experience since the 
establishment of the PA, and despite the economic developmental goals present in Oslo 
strategies and discourses, legal reform in the economic sector was paralleled by 
continuous deterioration and dependency of the Palestinian economy.  
Immediately after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, optimism about the future 
of the Palestinian economy prevailed. This optimism has faded into oblivion.5 Despite 
the developmental goals integrally included in the peace process, and the huge amount of 
money injected directly or indirectly in the PA finance, by the international donor 
community, the PA economy remained below what have been prior to 1993.6  
                                                 
2 Palestine, here, territorially speaking refers to oPt (occupied Palestinian territories), including the 
territories now under PA control and Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem, candidate to statehood. The state of 
Palestine was declared in Algiers in 1988, but many believes the "state of Palestine" is not a state and that 
the state called Palestine is still to be established in parts of historical Palestine, mainly in the territories 
occupied by Israel in 1967 (or at least part of them), i.e. WBGS. The analyses included therein, although 
studies on the light of the limited character of the PA, thus before statehood, serve to anticipates how the 
Palestinian economic legislations following statehood will look like. 
3 The time-frame of this essay is 1994-2006, i.e. the year of the establishment of the PA until the second 
legislative elections which took place in February 2006 and the following measures taken by the 
international community against the PA because of Hamas on power.  
4 Some prefer to use the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), as some of the authors cited here. The two 
terms are used in this paper to indicate the same thing.  
5 D. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in Palestine Revisted: An Analysis of the Revised Palestinian 
Investment Law, 31 Case W. Res. J. Int.l L. 300 (1999). 
6 Anne Le More makes reference to a World Bank report of June 2000 (aid effectiveness in the West Bank and 
Gaza), in which it is estmated that if the growth rates were sustained, it would take a decade before real 
Palestinian GNP/capita reached its 1993 level. The same author cites a different MAS/World Bank report 
of 1999 in which it is stated that the real per capita expenditure was at its lowest level in 1999 for any year 
since 1980. A. Le More, Killing with Kindness: Funding the Demise of a Palestinian State, 81 International 
Affairs 984 (205). 
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Part I will provide an introductory discussion of three questions: First, why legal reform 
in the economic sector? Second, how does legal reform emerge from statutory laws? 
Third, what is the relationship, if any, between statutory laws and economic 
development?  
In Part II, the limitations on the PA’s power to legislate, especially in the economic 
sector, are discussed. Two areas within the economic sector are addressed. The first one 
is investment promotion, which is vital for the development of economies. The second 
area is related to the financial regulations in the territories under PA control; this includes 
the banking sector, currency exchanges, and other financial transactions.  
After having described the failures of legal reform in the economic sector (if economic 
growth and development are the criteria), Part III suggests a need to find the solution 
outside law. This paper shall argue that the PA had passed from factual dependency, 
reflecting the historical subjugation of the Palestinian land and people to foreign 
authorities, to structural dependency reflecting, on the contrary, the use of law and legal 
institutions to perpetuate this dependency in the existent Palestinian political, economic 
and social structures. If factual dependency is directly connected to foreign occupation, 
structural dependency concerns other actors, including those nationals (institutions and 
individuals) who maintain the current system, and the international community 
contributing indirectly through political and economic support.  
Accordingly, legal reform, if intending to succeed, cannot be limited to changes in 
statutory laws. On the contrary, it must be a comprehensive process that includes the 
political level (ending the occupation), the developmental agenda (revising donors' role 
and strategies) and institutional (reforming the PA institutional and legal systems).  
1.1. The Need of Legal Reform in the Economic Sector  
In 1994, the year the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established, financial and 
commercial law in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) was still rooted in the 
Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate and the Israeli Military Orders in the Gaza Strip. 
As to the West Bank, legal sources dated back to the Jordanian period as well as to the 
Israeli Military Orders. These laws are, to large extent, still applicable.7  
                                                 
7 In fact, in 1948, West Bank fell under Jordanian rule then annexed to Transjordan in 1950, forming the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan while Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian control. Jordan had undertaken a 
complete process of unification of existing laws, starting by adopting a new constitution (1952) which 
abrogates expressly the (British) Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922 and its amendments, a new Nationality 
Law (1954) extending the Jordanian nationality to West Bank Palestinians and those who have been 
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Reforming the financial and commercial laws constituted a priority for the PA upon its 
establishment, for at least three reasons: First, most of these enactments were outdated 
and needed adaptation to modern developments in the financial sector and international 
trade. The antiquated character of the laws resulted in part from the Israeli occupation, 
which had "left the Palestinian political and legal systems ill prepared for facilitating a 
modern, market economy."8 Second, by reforming the financial and commercial laws, the 
PA hoped to attract local and foreign investors to participate in the Palestinian economy. 
Third, the PA had undertaken a legal unification process aiming at harmonizing the 
varied legal systems in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS).9  
Quoting the World Bank, Fidler considers legal and institutional reform as essential to 
enabling economic development and growth, encouraging foreign investment, and 
developing the private sector; accordingly, "legal reform and credible political institutions 
to implement the law are critical to the development of a modern Palestinian economy."  
Various attitudes, not always consistent with each other, characterize approaches to legal 
reform. For example, the legal diversity between WBGS, easily accommodated in some 
legal systems through constitutional and administrative arrangements among 
constituencies, is presented in the Palestinian case as an undesirable foreign (or even a 
colonial) imposition rather than an authentic legal development. For this reason, the 
process of legal unification and harmonization is presented as an integral part of the 
overall Palestinian liberation project. The problem with such an approach is that it 
obscures the transitional character of the PA and conflates liberation and state-building. 
By contrast, at the other extreme is a position that negates ab intitio the possibility of legal 
reform under occupation. According to this approach, it is impossible to realize legal 
reform before statehood. The problem with such an approach is that it confuses the 
                                                                                                                                            
expulsed from Palestine and took permanent residence in Jordan. The new Jordanian parliament started a 
complete revision of the existing laws, approaching more to the civil law system. On the contrary, the 
Egyptian authorities did never try to annex Gaza Strip and this policy had reflected to their law-making 
approach; the Egyptian law does not extend to Gaza Strip and the Palestinian nationality remained de iure 
valid although Palestinians of Gaza became de facto stateless. The legal systems and enactments in Gaza 
Strip remained almost intact. When Israel, in 1967, occupied both WBGS, it unified both territories by 
applying same colonial policies although keeping existing legal separation between the two entities. Two 
parallel military governments and civil administration were formed and the military orders were adopted 
separately for both territories (although, often, with similar content). However, legal and judicial 
development was harshly blocked by the Israeli occupation since 1967 while Israeli military orders and 
Courts served as a tool for the realization of occupation interest, thus, changing progressively the existing 
legal system(s) of the oPt, violating Hague conventions which applies in time of war and occupation.  
8 Fidler, supra note 5, 299-300.  
9 The last objective, which can be considered as the overall objective of legislating under the PA, was 
expressly mentioned in the decree number 1 of 1994, issued in Tunisia by Yaser Arafat, (by then) 
nominated President of the PA.  
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process of legal reform with the objectives that are expressly or implicit in such reform. 
As a matter of fact, ‘legal reform’ through changes in statutory laws, is indeed taking 
place in the territories under PA control.  
Beyond these philosophical differences, legal reformers faced several concrete challenges. 
First, the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements (hereinafter the agreements) had been enabling the 
establishment of the PA, governing the 'Autonomous Territories', which are the 
disconnected territorial entities making up the oPt; nonetheless and despite this nominal 
authority, the occupation persisted as a fact of government, in its structures, laws and 
courts. Second, although the PA was authorized to legislate, its legislative authority was 
expressly limited by the agreements.10 Third, the legislative process had not been always a 
coordinated and harmonized process of legal unification and reform. On the contrary, 
legislative initiatives and outcomes had been subject to different internal and external 
inputs, which had resulted in chaotic legal environment.  
For Robinson there are three overriding obstacles to legal reform in Palestine: the 
divergence in the legal codes and traditions of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
unconsolidated lines of authority in the legal field, and overall lack of clarity of 
jurisdiction. For him, however, the first, legal diversity, is the single most important 
obstacle.11  
1.2. Legal Reform through Statutory Laws 
The need for change, especially in the economic sector, in the post-Oslo period, and the 
establishment of the PA has been proven. Institutions, whenever existent, tend to 
change, but usually slowly, and not always in accordance with conscious planning.12 In 
the Palestinian case, "national" institutions needed to be created da capo, and changing the 
laws through statutory legislation became the tool to immediately start the process of 
change and adaptation to the new reality.  
This project of legislation-driven adaptation has yielded results. In fact, despite the 
anomalies related to its non-state character, the PA has enacted several laws pertaining to 
                                                 
10 It may argued that this was essentially the position of the PA before the end of what was to be the 
transitional period (1994-1999); this tendency was converted later on, especially following the second 
Intifada, the end of the transitional period without an agreement of final issues, and the reform process that 
was imposed on the PA.  
11 G. Robinson, The Politics of Legal Reform in Palestine 27 (1) Journal of Palestine Studies 54 (1997).  
12 R. Seidman, The Fatal Race: Law-Making and the Implementation of Development Goals, Third World 
Legal Studies 82 (1992). 
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the commercial and financial sector.13 Other regulations are under preparation.14 It may 
be questionable whether or not the enacted laws are compatible with international 
standards established by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund. A generalized judgment may be misleading; rather, a 
case-by-case study is needed; however, such kind of analyses, although important, goes 
beyond the objectives of this paper.15 Notwithstanding such assessments, serious steps 
have been undertaken by the PA (although sporadic and dependent on political 
developments) in the direction of legal reform in the economic sector. 
Contrary to what the concept of reform may suggest such change cannot occur through 
punctuated, surgical interventions, but rather only through a never-ending process. This 
is particularly true in the case of economic regulations where it is almost (theoretically 
and practically) impossible for the lawmaker to anticipate future contingencies.16 
Accordingly, creating an enabling environment for economic through establishing 
adequate legal and institutional framework becomes a priority at the same time that 
simplistic concepts of discrete and limited reform will fall short.  
Pistor et al, while analysing impact of transplantation on the corporate laws of six 
countries, have indicated why certain legal systems stagnate, and thus reject or only 
parially receive legal transplants.17 First, existing law could represent a perfectly adequate 
set of rules that requires no change; second, informal governance mechanisms may work 
sufficiently well to render law irrelevant; third, the state may direct economic activities 
through administrative rules and regulations; fourth, there may be little demand in a 
country for a particular set of rules where economic conditions are sufficiently different 
to render them unimportant.  
                                                 
13 Such as the Palestinian Monetary Authority Law of 1997, the Investment Promotion Law of 1998, the 
Cities and Free Industrial Zones Law of 1998, the Arbitration Law of 2000, the Labour Law of 2000, the 
Banking Law of 2002, the Income Tax Law of 2004, etc. Those legilsative texts were published in the 
Palestinian Official Journal and can be found on http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu .  
14 Such as the Commercial Law, the Company Law, Secured Lending and Leasing Law, Accounting and 
Auditing Law. Those texts are still under discussion by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) but the 
draft have beein ciruclating to the general public. 
15 However, the author shall refer, as much as needed and in the appropriate sections, to studies and 
analyses done on certain endorsed laws from the perspective of consistency to international standards.  
16 K. Pistor et al., Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries, 18 
(1) The World Bank Research Observer 108 (2003).  
17 Legal transplant is a very common experience in developing legal systems and makes part of legal reform 
process. The same author had proven that legal transplant is not an easy (and certainly not a short-term) 
solution for countries with less developed legal systems.  
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In addition to these sources of resistance to legal reform, there is also a dynamic, not 
uncommon particularly in developing countries, whereby such resistance to smooth or 
orderly change may nevertheless be followed by sporadic bouts of radical legal change, in 
response to a crisis. In this pattern of resistance followed by sudden change, the legal 
reforms enacted tend to be more radical, and at times even erratic. In fact, altthough 
crises are important motors for legal reform, crisis-driven legal reform can mean that 
lawmakers overreact in a backlash fashion.18  
This paper does not pretend to exhaust the topic of economic reform nor the legal and 
institutional changes to accommodate such a reform. On the contrary, this paper merely 
hopes to contribute to such efforts, through the analyses of selected statutory laws in this 
particular case study.  
What is suggested by the foregoing is that the adoption of statutory law is not the end of 
the process, but a step forward (or backward, according to interpretation given to its 
provision). In fact, studying legal reform through statutory laws suffers from an analytic 
shortcoming because the study of legal reform cannot be exhausted through statutory 
laws, seen by the dichotomy between the law-on-the-books and the enforced law or law-
in-action. However a look at statutory reforms, however limited, does provide insight 
into the larger reform process. Besides, it shall be admitted, in some cases, that the 
process itself of law-change is more important than the rules included therein. In other 
words, we use statutory law as a source for analyzing the timing and locus of legal 
change.19  
This paper also suggests that such efforts of legal reform through statutory laws can 
achieve little in the absence of a positive policy environment and improved political 
conditions. In fact, the Palestinian economy has been suffering on the one hand from 
high dependency on international aid and lies under the direct domination of the Israeli 
economy,20 and on the other, from several PA inadequate practices and mismanagement 
that hinder the establishment of a viable Palestinian economy. 
Indeed the Palestinian legal reform experience is influenced and in different historical 
stages hampered by developments and pressures from international players and political 
                                                 
18 Pistor et al, supra note 16, p.108. 
19 Pistor et al, supra note 16, p.91. 
20 For more details on the extent of dependency of the Palestinian economy, see E. Young, Palestinian 
Economic Dependence on Israel, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, IFC (23.03.2006). 
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events. These and other factors caused an unforeseen meltdown of Palestinian 
investment during a period of supposed peace and state-building, not only due to the 
internal obstacles and incompetence of Palestinian politicians, but it was inevitable that 
under-development will be the result of an unwise policy of trying to integrate the 
Palestinian economy in the global development without understanding the difficulties of 
reforming a complex entity in an in-conflict stage and prior to achieving perceptible 
results on the political level.  
1.3. Statutory Laws and Economic Development  
This paper, as the title may suggest, is based on three inter-related assumptions. First, 
there is a relationship between law and development; in fact, the importance of law and 
legal institutions for economic development is widely acknowledged.21 The recognition 
of a relationship between law and development does not suggest that it is possible 
empirically to conclusively establish the contribution of law and legal institutions to 
economic growth and development; it is even more difficult to establish a clear empirical 
relation between the quality of particular rules or statutes and economic development. 
However, some studies have shown that the perception data that measure effectiveness 
of legal institutions are positively correlated with the level of per capita GDP.22 
Second, in contemporary states development goals (considered mainly but not only in 
economic terms) legitimize and justify legal reform. In fact, given that development 
constitutes the process by which society attempts to overcome mass poverty and 
powerlessness,23 and that law has played a crucial role in the modernization and 
industrialization of many countries,24 law becomes a key determinant towards the 
realization of economic growth and prosperity.  
Third, law making or changing, although becoming increasingly urgent, does not ensure 
per se the realization of development or even economic amelioration.25 This fact is 
                                                 
21 Pistor et al, supra note 16, p.89. 
22 Pistor et al, supra note 16, pp.92-93. 
23 A. Seidman, Participation and the Law, Third World Legal Studies 1 (1993).  
24 Pistor et al, supra note 16, p.92. 
25 Law making is not limited to enactments issued by the legislative authority in a country (laws) or the 
executive authority (bylaws, legislative decrees or decree laws) but extends to the administration in general 
and the judiciary. The administration in charge of executing the law in force, and represents the state 
authority vis-à-vis the citizens while the judiciary applies and interpret the law in force. However, legal 
"reform" considered as rational process of legal change aiming at adapting the law in force in coherence 
with certain objectives, is often put in force by state authority through legislative enactments; for this 
reason, this essay is limited to the analyses of law making through the PLC and by governmental bylaws.  
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explained, by some,26 as resulting from the exclusion of the main target of development 
from the process of law making, ending up by causing poverty and powerlessness rather 
than resolving those problems.27 For Robert Seidman, poverty and powerlessness result 
from institutions understood as patterns of behavior. The organized polity can most 
readily manipulate the law; some governments did not do so in ways that reduced 
poverty and powerlessness, but rather in ways that maintained and increased poverty and 
powerlessness. Law became not part of the solution but part of the problem.28  
Based on the law itself, others29 explain the failure of law in achieving development goals 
for any of the following reasons: first, because they continue in force the received law 
(colonial legacy) thus did enact genuinely development-oriented laws. Second, the new 
laws fail to prevent inappropriate behaviours or induce appropriate behaviours. This 
happens because they did not take into account accurately the milieu within which the 
actors chose to obey or disobey the new law, or because the laws assumed that the 
implementing agencies specified in the law would behave in ways they did not.30 
As shall be shown by the Palestinian experience since the establishment of the PA, 
statutory law reform, although charged with development (and many other) goals, 
contributed to maintain existent colonial structures, laws and practices, which had 
characterized Palestinian economy and society as a whole during the Israeli occupation,31 
and crystallized the PA economic weak performance.  
Legal reform and statutory law change alone were not able to contribute to the de-
colonization efforts. On the contrary exogenous and endogenous factors contributed as 
will be shown to the enhancement of the existent colonial structures, and reproduction 
of dependent socio-economic structures.  
Accordingly, this essay does not suggest that there is necessarily direct causal or 
consequential relationship between law and economic development. On the contrary, it 
                                                 
26 A. Seidman, supra note 23, pp.1-11.  
27 The author argues, that: "Law and the state cannot, however, simply legislate the imposition of measures 
designed by experts and expect development to occur." Seidman, supra note 23, p.2.  
28 R. Seidman, supra note 12, p.81.  
29 R. Seidman, supra note 12, pp.81, 83. 
30 R. Seidman, supra note 12, p.83. 
31 For Robert Seidman every Third World country at independence initially continued in force the colonial 
legal order. A fortiori the PA, which is not an authority of an independent state but rather an authority 
which co-existed side by side (or even under the supreme authority of?) the Israeli occupation, continued 
inevitably the colonial legal order. R. Seidman, supra note 12, p.82. 
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intends to put Palestinian (de-developed)32 economy in its institutional and legal 
framework; besides, the paper shall present PA efforts to reform (through legislation) in 
the economic sector aiming at realizing development objectives.  
PART II: The PA Legal and/or Statutory Reform  
The PA had been facing challenges related to economic growth and development; as will 
be shown later on (Part III/section 3) this is not totally dependent on legal issues, but on 
the same structure and structural dependency of the PA. However, observers and experts 
have been advocating for the revision of existing legal framework, which was hindering 
growth and development.  
For Brynen,33 the legal context in the oPt, including the territories under PA control, is 
characterized by regulatory hurdles and a lack of legal transparency which increases the 
burden, risk, and confusion of doing business. In addition, he argues, the existing duality 
between Gaza Strip and the West Bank had been causing different economic advantages 
for foreign investment.  
This chapter intends to present case studies of statutory laws that regulate investment 
and financial issues. However, the power of the PA to legislate constrained by many 
limitations, especially in the economic sector, which was regulated to the smallest details 
by Paris Protocol.  
2.1. The Power of the PA to Legislate  
According to the Declaration of Principles, the "Council" that shall be elected (only) by 
the Palestinians of the WBGS and shall be entitled to legislate, in coherence with the 
Israeli Palestinian Agreements (hereinafter the agreements). This governing body (later 
replaced by the Palestinian Legislative Council or PLC) was an important innovation of 
the agreements, and meant that "Palestinian laws" were now enacted by elected (WBGS) 
Palestinian representatives. It meant also, however, (and this was inevitable) that 
legislation would be limited to the powers "transferred" to the Council by the Israeli 
Military governor and by the Israeli civil administration and within the framework of the 
agreements between the government of Israel and the PLO, recognized as the 
                                                 
32 De-development is used by Sarah Roy to represent the systematic destruction of an indigenous economy 
by a dominant power. Cited in: S. Alissa, The Economics of an Independent Palestine, in: J. Hilal (ed.), 
Where Now for Palestine? The Demise of the Two-State Solution 140 (London: Zed Books, 2007).  
33 R. Brynen, Buying Peace? A Critical Assessment of International Aid to the West Bank and Gaza, 25(3) 
Journal of Palestine Studies 86 (Spring 1996). 
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representative of the Palestinian people. In many cases, even where the PA has legislated, 
its laws are rendered ineffective because of both de facto Israeli control on territories and 
de jure Israeli control of governing functions not transferred to the PA.  
According to the Interim agreement (Article XVIII.4.b), the PA President shall not 
promulgate legislation adopted by the Council if in contradiction with the agreements. 
The Law n.4 of 1995 regulated the law-making process even before the election of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and remained in force after that event. This law 
institutionalized the predominance of the executive body (mainly the President) over the 
legislative body. It gives the President a veto right which enabled him to ignore for years 
several laws that were adopted by the PLC (including the Basic Law itself, which was 
adopted by the PLC in 1997 but was not endorsed by the President until 2002). Those 
are signs of the authoratitive nature of the PA; it was in part a legacy of the centralized, 
secretive and patronage-based bureaucratic structure of the revolutionary PLO in exile 
the authoritarian nature of the PA regime; nevertheless, one shall admit that it was also a 
product of the peace agreements.34  
Following the first elections of the PA President and the 88 members of the PLC in 
1996,35 the new legislative actor (PLC) replaced the Council of the PA in the process 
created by the above Law. The By-Law of the PLC, adopted in 2000, regulated internal 
procedures at the PLC which contains several attempts of emancipation from President's 
predominance but remained ineffective in front of the mentioned law.  
Following the adoption of the Basic Law in 2002, the legislative process went through a 
revolutionary change, one which was highly appreciated by those struggling for the rule 
of law. In theory, the PLC could bypass the President's refusal to endorse the Law 
according to Article 57 (and following amendments in 2003, Article 41): “The President of 
the National Authority shall promulgate laws after being ratified by the Palestinian Legislative Council 
within thirty days from referring them to him…”. In other words, the PLC now had all the legal 
instruments to bypass any possible Presidential disapproval of its legislation.36  
                                                 
34 Le More, supra note 6, p.985. 
35 In the 2006 elections, number of sieges at the PLC were extended to 132 members.  
36 Although this article passed also inobserved and several laws remained unendorsed by PA President for 
long periods.  
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A mixture of the above (still in force) provisions shapes the legislative process37 under 
the PA, which currently involves three phases: first, the initiation phase, which 
presupposes a legislative policy and an effective drafting of the proposed law;38 second, 
the discussion phase, which includes the so-called "general discussion", followed by two 
(or three) sessions of debates concluded by the adoption or rejection of the draft law; 
and third, the endorsement and promulgation phase, which includes the endorsement of 
the President (or, otherwise, suggestions of amendments), promulgation in the Official 
Journal and the execution through by-laws. The actors and skills needed for each phase, 
as much as gaps and limitations, are various.39  
2.2. PLO-Israeli Agreements and Economic Governance Problems  
The PLO-Israel economic agreement called "Paris Protocol" and the Washington 
Agreement signed between the PLO and Israel in September 1995,40 set the framework 
for economic relations between the PA and Israel.41 Bilaterally, the Paris Protocol states 
the basic principle of free trade with Israel, establishes a quasi-customs union, and gives 
the PA the right to run its domestic affairs, such as the authority to impose direct and 
                                                 
37 Here referring exclusively to procedures regulating Law making process, not secondary legislations.  
38 The legislative initiative is granted by the BL to the Council of Ministers and to any deputy of the PLC. 
Suggestions were made by experts to effectuate changes in this phase in order to give priority to bills 
presented by government (needed to realize public policies) from those suggested drafts from deputies. 
They also suggest to limit deputies' right to present draft laws to certain numbers of deputies and not to 
individual deputies.  
39 The legal and regulatory framework of the Palestinian legislative process has been the object of 
numerous studies and analyses by experts, some of which have documented the following interconnected 
gaps and limitations: First, in the preparatory phase: the absence of general legislative policy and 
planning; and the unclear regulations on the authority of the Cabinet concerning legislative priorities and 
decisions taken within. Second, in the discussion phase: the possibility of the PLC speaker holding on 
to proposed laws without detailing a timeframe for presentation and general discussion; the possibility for 
one or more deputies to present draft laws. There were calls for amendments to increase the number of 
deputies necessary to propose laws. The secondary role of the PLC committees and the possibility of 
proceeding without waiting for their reports. Third, in the promulgation phase: The unclear legal 
provisions concerning amendments that may be proposed by the President and the way the law is 
promulgated following the vote of the PLC. The complete control the Executive Branch of government 
has over the decision to publish laws in the Official Journal. The absence of strategic planning or (in some 
instances) political will needed to adopt the necessary by-laws required to enact the laws. This is not, 
however, the main issue here. The Institute of Law at Birzeit University has undertaken several studies on 
the different phases in the process of legislation. For more details, see the table in Annex II.  
40 The Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self Government Arrangements signed on 13 
September 1993 between the PLO and Israel served as a basic text for subsequent agreements between the 
two sides. According to Article 1 of the DOP, an Interim Self-Government would be established for the 
Palestinian people in the WBGS. The DOP and especially the Interim Agreement of 1995 have laid down 
the structure, the powers, and the jurisdictions of the PA. For more details and the text of these 
agreements see http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_peace_process_outline.php 
41 For more details regarding PA legislative authority in economic and financial sector, see: S. Fares, S., On 
the Road to Economic Integration with the European Union: Palestine's Legal Requirements (Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, 2006). 
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indirect taxes, establish a monetary authority except the issuance of a Palestinian 
currency, set industrial policy and insurance issues.42 As for third party trade, it regulates 
the relation between the PA and the rest of the world regarding import taxes and import 
policy, monetary and financial issues, direct and indirect taxation, labour, agriculture, 
industry, and tourism.43  
The PA’s monetary and financial powers are provided in Article IV of Paris Protocol. 
This Article has created the Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) acting as a Central 
Bank with limited powers.44 According to this Article the PMA will serve as the PA’s 
official economic advisor and it is responsible for licensing, supervising and inspecting 
banks, managing foreign exchange and foreign currency transactions, and it will have 
powers and responsibilities for the regulation and supervision of capital activities in the 
Palestinian territories, including the licensing of capital market institutions, finance 
companies and investment funds. 
Nonetheless, the PMA’s ability to act as a Central Bank is restricted by the 
absence of an own currency. According to Article IV of Paris Protocol "the New Israeli 
Shekel (NIS) will be one of the circulating currencies in the Palestinian territories and will legally serve 
as means of payment for all purposes including official transactions”. The Jordanian Dinar (JD), the 
NIS, and United States Dollar (USD) are the main currencies circulating in the oPt.  
In accordance with the Paris Protocol, Israel has transferred to the PA several powers 
and responsibilities relating to economic policy.45 Hence, the PA has legislative powers 
over different activities, which include banks and other financial institutions, financial 
markets and insurance activities. However, Israel’s economic policy prior and after the 
                                                 
42 According to Fidler, Palestinian goods were to move freely into the Israeli market. Such access to the 
significant Israeli market promised to eliminate the discriminatory treatment suffered by Palestinian goods 
during the period of occupation. The Economic Protocol did not, however, provide for free movement of 
labor between Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Fidler adds that the Protocol subjected Palestinian 
imports to the Israeli customs regime, with the exception of certain products that could be imported at 
tariff rates set by the PA. Although during the Economic Protocol negotiations the Palestinians pushed for 
a free trade arrangement that would allow them to set their own tariffs on imports, Israel wanted a customs 
union to avoid recognizing Palestinian borders as would be required under a free trade arrangement. Fidler, 
supra note 5, pp.298-299. 
43 A. Arnon and T. Weinblatt, Sovereignty and Economic Development: The Case of Israel and Palestine, 
111 The Economic Journal, Blackwell 295-298 (2001).  
44 A. Arnon et al, The Palestinian Economy: Between Imposed Integration and Voluntary Separation, 138 
(Brill, 1997).  
45 For more details regarding PA authority to legislate in the transitional period, see: A. Khalil, Legislating for 
Migration, The Anomalous Case of the Palestinian Authority, Analytical and Synthetic Legal Note (CARIM, 2006). 
Available online: http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/e-texts/CARIM-AS06_11-Khalil.pdf (accessed on 20 January 
2007).  
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signature of the Protocol, was directed towards eliminating any form of a sovereign 
Palestinian entity and undermining the struggle of the Palestinian people for self-
determination. Instead of laying “the groundwork for strengthening the economic base of the 
Palestinian side” as formulated in the preamble of the Protocol, it intensified former 
inequity and dependence on the Israeli economy.  
The quasi-customs union gave Israel the right to collect import taxes and VAT. Article 
III of Paris Protocol stipulates a so called “revenue clearance system,” which provides 
that levies on goods that are destined for the WBGS should be transferred to the PA. 
Israel utilized this right to hold and/or delay these revenues, as a mean of pressure and 
punishment. Closures, checkpoints, movement restrictions, bypass roads for settlers and 
a separation wall, are further tools to isolate Palestinians from one another and from the 
rest of the world. Trade with other countries should be handled according to the 
Protocol through Israeli ports or through Israeli controlled borders between the oPt with 
Jordan and Egypt. The use of prolonged border closures constitutes a real threat to the 
Palestinian economy and makes it impossible for the Palestinians to create long term 
investments.46  
The Protocol was intended to serve Israeli-Palestinian trade during the interim period, 
which ended on May 1999, and the Protocol is still de facto applicable, in the absence of a 
breakthrough on the political level. The experience of the last years has shown that 
agreements with unbalanced distribution of power will not be effective and sustainable, if 
people are denied economic freedom to control their own land and resources.  
Fidler notes that the Economic Protocol has, from the Palestinian perspective, collapsed 
because of the Israeli border closures and other security measures prevailing Israel's 
security over Palestinian need for economic development. Besides, the modified customs 
union arrangement has not worked well for the Palestinians. Given all these factors, it is 
hardly surprising that the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian economic relationship 
structured in the Economic Protocol is being critically questioned.47  
2.3. Promoting Investment  
After recovering a part of the territory, the Palestinians have commenced a new era; it 
was natural that the new stage of political activity under the PA be accompanied with a 
                                                 
46 Arnon et al, supra note 44, p.138. 
47 Fidler, supra note 5, pp.301-303. 
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new epoch of economic activity. On the one hand, the PA would aim to use and develop 
resources and cooperate as well as integrate with other states in the fields of planning and 
social and economic development on the other hand. For those reasons, the PA could 
not wait until the election of the legislative and presidential elections in 1996 to adopt a 
law related to investment promotion. In fact, the President of the PA had endorsed Law 
No. 6 of 1995 Concerning the Promotion of Investment.48  
Between the Declaration of Principles in 1993 and the adoption of the original 
Investment Law in 1995, the legal structure for investment in the oPt was judged 
inadequate.49 A modern and unified investment law became a must,50 as was largely 
recognized in early years of the peace process. In fact, an investment promotion law can 
rightly be considered as one of the most important economic laws. It exerts a direct 
effect on economic growth by attracting capital to invest in production and enterprises 
that propel the economic wheel in the Palestinian territories. Since the Palestinian 
territories have already suffered from an unstable economic situation, the PA was 
interested in creating an economic environment that attracts investors to the PA 
controlled territories. 
When the Palestinian Investment Law was adopted, it was a disappointment.51 For 
Brynen the Investment Law sought to attract external investors by offering tax 
exemptions but did little to resolve the more fundamental obstacles to private sector 
development.52 For Fidler, PA efforts to address the needs for legal reform have not 
always been successful. The Investment Law is a case in point.53  
In response to criticisms, the PA engaged in extensive studies and consultations seeking 
advice on how to improve the law. It was natural that a number of modifications be 
introduced to investment methods and controls in order to produce more facilitation in 
                                                 
48 Promulgated on April 30, 1995 and published in Issue No. 5 of the Palestinian Official Gazette, June 5, 
1995, p.6. To notice that, contrary to most other laws, the Palestinian law concerning investment 
promotion is not derived from any other piece of legislation, which has been inherited from past legislative 
periods. 
49 Fidler, supra note 5, p.309. 
50 Brynen, supra note 33, p.86. 
51 Fidler, supra note 5, p.310. The same author referes criticisms made by intergovernmental and academic 
experts (World Bank, MAS...) on the law in question, considering it as an inadequate legal response for 
Palestinian economic development.  
52 Brynen, supra note 33, pp.86-87. 
53 For Fidler the revised Investment Promotion Law of 1998 did not resolve that issue neither. For him, 
many factors have combined to create low levels of private investment, both domestic and foreign, in the 
Palestinian Territories. Fidler, supra note 5, p.303-307. 
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the procedures as well as tackle obstacles, which hinder investment progress. The Law of 
Investment Promotion No. 1 of 199854 has been enacted in order to replace the original 
one.55 The adoption and revision of the Palestinian Investment Law form part of the 
PA's attempt to create the proper legal enabling environment for investment.56 
Different arguments and interpretations can be given to the changes effectuated in the 
1998 Investment Promotion Law. Some see in the new law not only an absence of 
reform, but even a regression in certain areas. For Fidler,57 the Revised Investment Law 
is perhaps the classic example of how the PA has not done what is considered necessary 
to reform its law to accommodate businesses in the global era. However, he adds, even if 
the PA had adopted a revised law that conformed to all international standards and 
practices, the success of this law would remain hostage to the effective reform of 
Palestinian commercial, trade, and tax laws.  
For Robert Seidman almost invariably, the early Third World political rhetoric called for 
radical change, usually using a socialist vocabulary. The laws enacted, mainly facilitated 
not the transition to socialism, but the continuation of growth of state capitalism.58 
Fidler, however, examined the provisions of the Revised Investment Law and explored 
ambiguities, questions, and problems that a reading of the text reveal. For him, the 
Revised Investment Law does not adhere to international standards and practices 
incorporated in the World Bank's Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct 
Investment and bilateral and multilateral treaties dealing with the treatment of foreign 
investment, including the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment being 
negotiated under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.59  
This disappointment some analysts60 of the law when compared to international 
standards and practices in protecting foreign investment was related to the fact that it 
confuses the scope of the principle of non-discrimination and the expansion of the areas 
in which the PA can exercise discretionary incentive powers. For Fidler, the 
                                                 
54 Palestine Gazette (Palestine National Authority), Issue No. 8.6.1998, p. 5.  
55 The 1998 Investment Law was also amended by the Amending Law No. 2 of 2004.  
56 Fidler, supra note 5, p.309. 
57 Fidler, supra note 5, p.348. 
58 R. Seidman, supra note 12, p.83. 
59 Fidler, supra note 5, pp.309-310. 
60 Fidler, supra note 5, p.343. 
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disappointing Revised Investment Promotion Law raises deeper questions about the 
nature of the reform of Palestinian law.61 For him, there are two possible interpretations 
of the process that produced the Revised Investment Law, which diverge dramatically 
and which tell very different stories about Palestinian law reform. The harsher 
interpretation focuses on the question from a philosophical angle, considering that the 
rejection of certain standards and practices is related to existent political opposition. The 
more lenient stance centers on more pragmatic problems facing the reform of Palestinian 
laws. The same author presented various arguments against the first approach, 
considering it contradictory to the developmental agenda of the peace process itself while 
at the same time considering that: "the politics of the peace process and the politics of 
the PA may have shattered the liberal vision of Palestinian economic development 
constructed in the Oslo process".62 On the contrary, the pragmatic perspective did not 
see in the Revised Investment law a rejection of liberal philosophy but another step in 
the overall process of Palestinian law reform.63  
2.4. Financial Regulations 
2.4.1. Banking Sector 
Until the establishment of the PA, Banks were not allowed to operate in the WBGS. 
Two Israeli military orders64 instructed the closure of all financial institutions working in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and replaced them by Israeli banks.65  
In 1994 and after the signature of Paris Protocol, the PA took the responsibility of 
regulating the financial sector. In accordance with Article IV of Paris Protocol the 
Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) was established in 1994 and the Palestinian 
Monetary Authority Law was promulgated.66 The PMA began its efforts to revive the 
                                                 
61 Fidler, supra note 5, p.344. 
62 Fidler, supra note 5, pp.344-345. 
63 Fidler, supra note 5, pp.346-347. 
64 Military Order concerning Prohibition of Trading and of Monetary Transactions (Banks) No. 7 of 1967, 
Proclamation, Orders and Appointments (West Bank), Issue no. 1, 11/08/1967, p.27 and Military Order 
concerning the Closure of Banks in the Region No. 18 of 1967, Proclamation, Orders and Appointments 
(Gaza Strip), Issue no. 1, 14/09/1967, p. 65. 
65 In late 1980s, as a result of winning a case in the Israeli High Court, the Bank of Palestine and the Cairo-
Amman Bank had re-opened their branches in Gaza Strip and the West Bank. For more details regarding 
banking sector regulations, see: Fares, supra note 41, pp.90-91. 
66 Palestine Gazette, Issue no. 21, 31/01/1998, p. 5. For more details about the development of the 
banking system in Palestine, see the official website of the PMA, http://www.pma-
palestine.org/bankenvi/bankenvi.html.  
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banking sector with limited capacities. The objective of the PMA is to secure monetary 
stability, the soundness of the banking system and encourage economic growth.67 The 
PMA has most the powers of a Central Bank and according to Article IV (7) Paris 
Protocol is empowered to supervise, regulate and license banks, to hold its foreign 
currency reserves and to regulate foreign exchange dealers. Further, it is responsible for 
regulating and supervising banking and money changers’ activities. The PMA is the 
executing agency for the Monetary Authority Law, the Banking Law and the Money 
Changers Law, pursuant to which it issues regulations on a regular basis. The PMA’s 
abilities are though restricted and it is not able to achieve its objectives in the absence of 
a national currency.  
From the establishment of the PMA until now, the PA has experienced a boom in the 
banking sector. The PMA has so far licensed 23 banks national and international banks 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The PA enacted “the Banking Law No. 2 of 2002”.68 The Banking Law applies to “all 
banks and financial institutions engaging in banking activities in Palestine” (Article 2). The PMA is 
the “sole agency authorized to execute the provisions of this law and to issue rules and instructions to 
implement its requirements” (Article 3.2). Pursuant to these provisions, the PMA periodically 
issues “rules and instructions” to regulate and supervise banks. The scope of the Banking 
Law is not clearly defined. Article 2 establishes that the Banking Law shall apply to “all 
banks and financial institutions engaging in banking activities,” but then banking activities and 
financial institutions are not defined.  
The Banking Law text should be more precise when addressing issues like the various 
types of bank reserves that the PMA may require, registration, licensing (including refusal 
appeals), confidentiality, mergers, inspections and liquidation, “management contracts”, 
means of payment vs. means of credit (cheques and debit/credit cards), and focus on 
other issues often addressed by international legislation like insurance protection for 
depositors, fiduciary responsibility of bank officers and electronic banking.  
                                                 
67 Article 5 of the Palestinian Monetary Authority law No. 2 of 1997.  
68 Palestine Gazette issue no. 41, 06/06/2002, p. 5.  
Asem Khalil and Jamil Salem. “The Legal Framework of Palestinian Economic (under)development.” Paper presented in the International Conference on Law and Economic Development: 
Towards Constructive Engagement in the Middle East (22-23 February 2007). Forthcoming in a book published by Cameron May Ltd, London in 2010. 19
2.4.2. Financial Transactions  
After the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel imposed its own 
currency as the sole legal tender69 in an attempt to control and integrate the Palestinian 
economy into that of Israel. With regard to financial transactions, Israeli military orders 
prohibited Palestinians from transferring and bringing banknotes, coins, credit cards, etc. 
into the WBGS without permission from the Head of the Israeli Civil Administration.70 
Furthermore, Israel made all transactions subject to a strict licensing system and imposed 
high charges on them. For example the “Military Order concerning Charges on Imported Services 
and Foreign Assets No. 1182 of 1986 in the West Bank” obliged Palestinians to pay 15 % of 
the total value of the service if they engage in such transactions.71 
After the establishment of the PA and according to Art 4 (6) of Paris Protocol, the PMA 
has taken partial responsibility for the regulation and supervision of capital transactions. 
Nonetheless, the PA has ignored, abolished and repealed all Israeli controls and military 
orders restricting the free movement of capital to and from the Palestinian territories.72 
In addition, the PMA has left all restrictions enforced by the Bank of Israel on banking 
operations. Palestinian individuals can open bank accounts without any limitations and 
they have the right to transfer any amounts without any limitations.73  
With such provisions, the PA has tried to regulate and liberalize financial transactions by 
ignoring in practice Israeli military orders that restrict the free movement of capital. 
Nonetheless, such efforts are limited and are not able to totally separate the Palestinian 
financial policy from the Israeli direct controls. The PA still has limited powers to 
facilitate the inflow of capital, which means that the PA cannot draw its own capital 
                                                 
69 Military Order No. 76 of 1967 concerning Instituting Israeli Currency as a Legal Tender replaced the 
Jordanian Dinar in the West Bank. Proclamation, Orders and Appointments (West Bank), Issue No. 5, 
15.11.1967, p. 191. The Egyptian Pound in the Gaza Strip was replaced by the Military Order No. 40 of 
1967 concerning Israeli Currency as Legal Tender. Proclamation, Orders and Appointments (Gaza Strip), 
Issue No. 2, 1.11.1967, p. 121.  
70 Article 2 of the Israeli Military Order No. 973 of 1982 Concerning Money Entering into the West Bank, 
Proclamation, Orders and Appointments (West Bank),Issue No. 55, 5.5.1983, p. 5, as amended by Military 
Orders No. 1070 of 1983, No. 1218 of 1988, No. 1243 of 1988, and No. 1272 of 1989.  
71 Proclamation, Orders and Appointments (West Bank), Issue No. 76, 12.9.1990, p. 7.  
72 See for example “Decision No. 20 of 1998 concerning the Revocation of some Israeli Military Orders in 
the Gaza Strip,” that explicitly repealed all Israeli military orders restricting the free movement of capital to 
and from the Gaza Strip. Palestine Gazette, Issue No. 23, 8.6.1998, p. 60.  
73 M. Zavadjil et al, Recent Economic Developments, Prospects, and Progress in Institution Building in the WBGS 29 
(Washington DC: IMF, 1998).  
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import policy. Accordingly, the PA must follow the Israeli military orders and all 
transactions must be reported to the Bank of Israel.  
Further limitations on the transfer of capital into the Palestinian territories can be drawn 
from international obligations in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. The 
Security Council adopted unanimously UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) in an attempt to 
protect and suppress the financing of terrorism. According to Article 2 of the resolution, 
member states are obliged to take all necessary measures to freeze the fund a and 
economic resources of natural and legal persons, groups or entities engaged in terrorist 
actions. The Resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and is 
therefore binding on all UN member states. 
The European Union has signed an interim Association Agreement with the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization in February 1997, entered into force in July 1997, under the 
umbrella of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.74 Article 3 of the Agreement stipulates 
a progressive liberalization of current payments and capital movement. This statement 
matches the European Council’s common strategy regarding such payments in the 
Mediterranean region.75 The Agreement allowed the contracting parties to limit financial 
transactions for balance of payment reasons (Article 29 of the Agreement) and national 
and international security reasons (Article 68 of the Agreement).  
After open, democratic, and fair elections, the Islamic Movement, Hamas, won the 
majority of the seats of the Palestinian Legislative Council. In reaction to this 
unpredicted victory, the Quartet (United Nations, United States of America, European 
Union, and Russian Federation) announced on 30 January 2006 that “all members of a future 
Palestinian government must be committed to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of 
previous agreements and regulations”.76 The Quartet decided on 29 March 2006 after the 
formation of the new Palestinian government to freeze all donor contributions until the 
Hamas led government commits to the Quartet’s three conditions.77 Recently, the 
                                                 
74 Official Journal L 187, 16.7.1997, p. 3-135.  
75 Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean Region 
(2000/458/CFSP), Official Journal L 183, 22.7.2000.  
76 Statement of Middle East Quartet, 30.01.2006, available at: 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/current!OpenPage.  
77 Quartet Statement on New Palestinian Government, 30.03.2006, available at: 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/current!OpenPage.  
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Quartet endorsed the continuation of the economic sanctions for a three month period 
till the 22 March 2007.78 
Israel on its part, denied transferring revenues and fees collected as a duty on imports as 
well as VAT on Israel merchandise and services for the Palestinian territories. According 
to the World Bank “the impact of the suspension of clearance revenue transfers and restrictions on 
movement and access would be much greater than the impact of reduced aid flows”.79 According to the 
same source, these revenues amounted to USD 740 million, two-thirds of PA revenues. 
It is worth mentioning that the suspension of the transfer of these revenues constitutes a 
breach of Paris Protocol.  
The measures taken by the Quartet and Israel have catastrophic effects on the economic 
situation in the Palestinian territories. According to the World Bank, the Quartet decision 
has a direct impact on approximately 172,000 unpaid employees of the PA and a million 
other Palestinians, or approximately 30% of the population in the WBGS, who survive 
on public sector salaries.80  
A direct impact on the operation of transferring money and fund through banks into the 
Palestinian territories had the decision of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the US 
Treasury Department, to prohibit transactions with the PA. According to this decision 
“US persons are prohibited to engage in transactions with the Palestinian Authority unless 
authorized”.81 Banks that refuse to comply with this act risk having their assets frozen and 
access to US markets denied. 
2.4.3. Currency Exchange 
A special importance characterizes legislation on currency exchange due to its relation to 
the security of the national economy and its direct relation to the monetary and banking 
system operative therein. Moreover, in the PA as in other developing economies, vital 
remittances from abroad come usually through the offices and storefronts of money 
changers.  
                                                 
78 Quartet Statement on Extension of Mechanism to Fund Palestinian Authority, 22.12.2006, available at: 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/current!OpenPage.  
79 West Bank and Gaza-Economic Update and Potential Outlook, World Bank, 15.03.2006, p. 1.  
80 The Impending Palestinian Fiscal Crisis: Potential Remedies, World Bank, 7.05.2006, pp. 3-4.  
81 Office of Foreign Assets Control at the Department of the Treasury: 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20060412.shtml.  
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Like other political systems and societies, successive regimes ruling over Palestine or 
parts thereof have enacted legislation regulating the sector of currency exchange. On July 
28, 1921, the British Mandate put forward a law on money change. Later, the British 
authorities enacted the Law Concerning Money Change No. 26 of 194182 and introduced 
subsequent amendments to it. In addition, Jordan passed the Provisional Law 
Concerning the Observation of Foreign Currency No. 95 of 196683 and subsequently 
introduced a number of amendments to it. The Israeli occupation authorities also issued 
forth approximately twenty military orders that regulate several aspects of money change. 
Most prominently, the Israeli authorities issued Military Order No. 705 of 198184, which 
comprises 91 articles as well as an appendix.  
In 1997, the Council of Ministers of the PA issued forth Decision No. 1 of 1997 
Concerning the Regulation of the Business of Money Change.85 Consisting of 33 articles, 
the Decision regulates most aspects of the exercise of money change business. The 
Decision also addresses the definitions of concepts, application for licences and the 
process of liquidation. Although it is based on the Law Concerning Money Change No. 
26 of 1941 and its amendments as well as the Provisional Law Concerning the 
Observation of Foreign Currency No. 95 of 1966 as is stated in its preamble, the 
Palestinian Council of Ministers’ Decision is in many aspects characterised as a statutory 
law rather than an executive decision which is usually issued by the Executive.  
Under the presidency of the late President Yasser ‘Arafat the Council of Ministers 
introduced two subsequent amendments to the aforementioned Decision. The first was 
Decision No. 2 of 199786 and the second Decision No. 4 of 2000.87  
These Decisions include several provisions that regulate the parties dealing with the 
money-change sector. They handle licensing of small money change enterprises, fees to 
be collected there from, allowed or prohibited acts for each category, and appointing the 
Monetary Authority as a central administrative agency thereto, as well as other issues.  
                                                 
82 Palestinian Official Gazette: The British Mandate, Issue No. 1134, October 9, 1941, p. 108.  
83 Jordanian Official Gazette: Issue No. 1958, October 22, 1966, p.2144.  
84 Proclamations, Orders and Announcements (Gaza Strip), 1.April 1982, p. 4549.  
85 Palestinian Official Gazette: Issue No. 17, 30.4.1997, p. 55.  
86 Palestinian Official Gazette: Issue No. 19, October 15, 1997, p. 47; to be referred to hereafter as the 
First Amendment 
87 Palestinian Official Gazette: Issue No. 33, June 30, 2000, p. 41; to be referred to hereafter as the Second 
Amendment 
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The existing regulations do not encourage money changers to engage in the formal sector 
and they do not feature a method or policy that supports the business of small and 
medium bureaux de change. Fees and financial burden are unbearably high. A policy should 
be adopted as to exempt small changers from fees for a period of time in order to enable 
them to establish their own enterprises and fulfil their liabilities towards their clients. 
Thereafter, fees can be imposed on these enterprises in a manner that does not 
overburden money changers. In addition, fees shall be collected on certain phases and in 
a gradual manner so that changers’ financial burdens are not increased and financial 
status is not affected.  
Many of the remittances coming from Palestinians working abroad pass through money 
changers, who do not participate in the payment system. This informal system is called 
“Hawala”. It is a fast, conventional and safe transfer of money, usually with a lower 
commission than that charged by banks, and is probably the most common informal 
value transfer system in the Palestinian territories. Money is transferred via a network of 
money brokers, who have connections to other brokers in the recipient country. The 
correspondent broker gives disposition instructions of the funds and promises to settle 
the debt at a later date. The whole arrangement takes place without any foreign exchange 
transactions and through bypassing official exchange rates. The Hawala system is based 
on trust and honour and does not have enforced rules behind its functioning.88  
Everybody recognises the relevance of the sector of money change. This sector should 
rely on internationally defined exchange rates. These rates are linked to particular 
alterations and accounts and bear direct relation with public services and issues of 
financial oversight. Therefore, the significance of this sector must be translated into a 
sound and strong legal regulatory system. This can be achieved through a law regulating 
the money change sector to be enacted by the PLC, not through decisions from the 
Council of Ministers. The two amendments to the Council of Ministers’ Decision No. 1 
of 1997 are not sufficient in terms of supporting money change enterprises. The law 
must feature rules which encourage and support owners of small bureaux de change, so 
as to enable them to exercise their roles in a positive manner. The prospective law must 
                                                 
88 For more details See M. Patrick, The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money 
Laundering (Interpol General Secretariat Lyon, 2000). available at 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp, and R. Ballard, 
Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity within Informal Value Transmission Systems: The 
Operational Dynamics of contemporary Hawala Networks, Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 6, No 4, 2005, pp. 
319-352 available at http://www.art.man.ac.uk/CASAS/pdfpapers/coaltions.pdf  
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also adopt effective policies regarding fees, exemption from fees, and manner of 
collecting fees in a way that does not affect the financial status of new and small money 
change enterprises.  
Part III. From factual to structural dependency  
There was an assumption by the concerned actors in Oslo peace process economic 
deprivation in the oPt would affect attitudes towards the peace process.89 As was proven 
earlier, the peace process and the consequent legal reform aiming at creating enabling 
environment for economic growth did not realize the development objectives. Maybe 
because the peace process did not have coherent objectives and priorities, thus always 
prevailing Israeli security over Palestinian need for economic development? Or maybe 
because the Palestinian economy and market were -and continued to be- dependent on 
the Israeli, and suffered Israeli unilaterally measures? Or maybe because the PA was not 
able to adopt harmonized legislative texts? This paper argues that all the above (and 
other reasons) contributed to the failure of legal reform, especially in terms of realization 
of expected economic growth and development; however, none of them can, by itself 
alone, claim exclusive responsibility.  
Dependent structures existed since the British mandate period; such structures, during 
colonial epoch, developed in most of the colonized countries and these were unable to 
build independent socio-economic entities. Although a de-colonization process in 
previous colonies took place, the majority of these countries are still under-developed 
and structurally dependent. The same applies for the Palestinian case, but with an 
additional factor; a new form of colonialism started after the end of World War II and 
the Palestinian land and people experienced a unique form of inhuman suppression and 
occupation. The Israeli occupying machinery, since 1967, has applied different 
mechanisms to maintain and transmit previous dependency forms into the new created 
reality, intensifying and consolidating dependent structures and preventing any kind of 
socio-economic development. 
Through the transmission of the old colonial structures into the occupational military 
orders system, the Palestinian society and after Oslo the PA were faced with a new form 
of structural heterogeneity. The Palestinian economy is characterized through traditional 
feudal methods of production and semi-modern structures, hence under-developed and 
                                                 
89 This fear finds empirical support in the fact that most West Bankers and Gazans, according to opinion 
bolls, blame their economic difficulties on Oslo. Fidler, supra note 5, p.300.  
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unable to fulfil the needs of the Palestinian population. Such an immature and unstable 
economic reality was not ready for new experiments on the political level and could not 
afford the failures of the peace process. Different factors, especially the confrontation 
between old colonial structures and the new heterogeneous sectors, led to the destruction 
of the reform initiatives and the manifestation and institutionalization of the old 
dependency forms resulted in more poverty and under-development. These factors 
caused societal deformation, as can be seen in the current internal Palestinian situation. 
In this section, we will present the three main actors of the developmental process 
undertaken in the oPt since the beginning of Oslo Agreements with the specific objective 
to underline what went wrong and why. As the title of this section suggests, the authors 
suggest that the institutional and legal dependency created by Oslo Agreements and some 
PA laws, bylaws and practices, convert to structural dependency of the Palestinian 
economy on the one side on the Israeli economy, and on the others on the international 
donors' community aids.  
3.1. Foreign Aid 
The belief that peace depends on Palestinian economic development was central in Oslo 
strategy, and international aid is one of the main pillars of Oslo strategy for Palestinian 
economic development.90 The main justification of the donor strategy has revolved 
around the elusive notion of 'supporting the peace process'. In the mid-1990s, the fear 
was that worsening economic conditions would lead to the political radicalization of the 
Palestinian society and derailment of the peace process.91 
International direct implication through massive financial aid was clear since early years 
of Oslo. However, for the Palestinians, international aid was slow and poorly targeted.92 
Rex Brynen tried to understand why.93 For him this is due to a number of reasons. The 
cultural clash between the realpolitik of foreign ministry officials and the commitment of 
their counterparts of sustainable development; the donor agencies' underestimation of 
the political and economic difficulties that lay ahead; the delivery of international 
assistance was also complicated by legal restrictions by domestic laws of donor countries; 
                                                 
90 Fidler, supra note 5, p.297. 
91 Le More, supra note 6, p.992. 
92 For Brynen the PA criticism of the pace of assistance has been in part politically motivated, a means of 
diverting attention from its own shortcomings and exerting pressure for accelerated disbursements. 
Brynen, supra note 33, p.83. 
93 Brynen, supra note 33, pp.80-83. 
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the institutional challenge of rapidly expanding aid programs; assistance was shaped 
heavily also by national priorities of donor countries with little coordination or even 
communication between them while tying the aid by preferences for suppliers from the 
donor country; the mismatch between sartorial goals identified by the Palestinians and 
the distribution of aid funds by donors.  
In recent years, different authors have dedicated several publications to this topic. Le 
More94 concluded even that the international donor community ended up by funding the 
demise of the Palestinian state. After having quoted a report from World Bank in 2004 in 
which it was stated that donor disbursements doubled to almost US$1 billion per annum 
while real personal incomes fell almost 40 per cent in the same period, she presented 
complementary explanations for the failutre of international aid to realize developmental 
goals.  
First, donors acted as if the aid effort in the WBGS could proceed independently from 
the political process. Since main topics remained unresolved in Oslo process, aid was 
directed towards keeping the peace process and the PA alive rather than fostering 
growth, development and the institutional basis for a state.95 Donors, on the contrary, 
continued to treat the West Bank and Gaza as a quasi normal 'sovereign' country. On the 
contrary, Le More concluded, aid can buttress but not replace political process.96  
Second, the shift of donors funds to emergency assistance rather than to development, 
on the one hand preventing further socio-economic deterioration and enabled vital social 
services to continue to function but on the other raising serious doubts regarding long-
term effectiveness and sustainability. This shift started as much as the mid-1990s, and 
not in 2000, as many believe, following the eruption of the second Intifida. For this 
reason, aid to the oPt has, on the whole, been overwhelmingly reactive and short term in 
nature. Beyond the issue of aid effectiveness, Le More argues that aid not only relieves 
Israel of its responsibilities under international humanitarian law but it has also clearly 
helped sustain its occupation, which would have been much trickier and more onerous to 
maintain had the international community not footed the bill.97  
                                                 
94 Le More, supra note 6, pp.981-999. 
95 Fidler had had the same conclusions regarding the shift of international aid. Fidler, supra note 5, p.301. 
96 Le More, supra note 6, p.999. 
97 Not to mention also the evidence that Israel benefits economically from donor funds: according to 
UNCTAD report of 2003 for every dollar produced in the oPt, an estimated 45 per cent goes back into the 
Israeli economy. Le More, supra note 6, pp.993-994.  
Asem Khalil and Jamil Salem. “The Legal Framework of Palestinian Economic (under)development.” Paper presented in the International Conference on Law and Economic Development: 
Towards Constructive Engagement in the Middle East (22-23 February 2007). Forthcoming in a book published by Cameron May Ltd, London in 2010. 27
3.2. The Israeli factor  
Many experts and observers present the Israeli role as determinant factor for the level of 
economic growth and development of the territories under PA control and the rest of 
the oPt: the dependency of Palestinian economy on the Israeli economy; the repeated 
Israeli closures of the oPt; the block on importation of necessary goods; the slow pace of 
Israeli tax clearances to the PA, and later on, the VAT clearance; the obstacles imposed 
by Israeli custom procedures; the difficulties of granting necessary visas and other 
documents for foreign experts working on development projects.98  
Those facts and measures, Brynen argued, are not always due to Israeli bureaucratic 
inertia but rather often result from deliberate Israeli policy. This policy is applied, 
according to the PA officials, as an Israeli means of forcing Palestinian concessions at the 
negotiating table. This proves also that aid effort has been caught up in the broader 
Palestinian Israeli negotiating process.99  
Anne Le More went in the same analytical direction, considering territorial fragmentation 
of the WBGS as a continuous Israeli policy, regardless of the political affiliation of 
parities in government.100 She then argued that the territorial fragmentation of the WBGS 
today is more pervasive than at any point since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 
1967.101 Besides, Israel enforced the internal closure (on Palestinian people, vehicle and 
goods) within the oPt by a complex permit system and is supplemented by the external 
sealing off of the WBGS from one another and from all neighboring countries.  
This "cantonization" of the WBGS has led to the disintegration of the economic links 
between its various pasts and contributed to the creation of disconnected economic 
clusters with increasingly less access to either the Israeli economy or to one another. 
Some other authors went further describing the Israeli policies with the term 
"Bantustanization", originally used in South African apartheid literature to refer to the 
                                                 
98 Brynen, supra note 33, pp.87-89. 
99 Brynen, supra note 33, p.88. 
100 Le More, supra note 6, pp.983-985. 
101 Notably the strict closure regime that has been imposed on the oPt since the early 1990s, its partition 
into areas A, B, and C following the 1995 Interim Agreement, and the creation of physical 'facts on the 
ground' on Palestinian land through such measures as large-scale house demolitions and land 
expropriation, jewish seelements and by-pass road expansion, and, more recently, the construction of the 
separation barrier in the West Bank which replicates the fence erected around Gaza in the 1990s. Le More, 
supra note 6, p.983.  
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development of the reserves set aside for African occupation into self-governing states, 
colloquially known as 'bantustans'.102  
4.3. The Palestinian Responsibility  
Having admitted the negative role played by the continuous Israeli occupation and 
colonial policies and having assisted the deficiencies of international aid, many authors 
argued that part of the responsibility should nevertheless be borne by the PA itself. The 
challenges facing the newly established PA in its primary mission of putting policies and 
laws aiming at enhancing growth and development have been varied: some are related to 
financial and structural means, others are related to the political system itself which lack 
transparency and accountability, and still others are related to lack of expertise and 
sometimes political well of the decision-makers.103  
There is evidence beyond these inadvertent shortcomings of intentional misdeeds by PA 
rulers, in the form of widespread corruption and the creation of PA monopolies, the 
absence of the Rule of Law, clientalism and neo-patrimonialism in distribution of 
resources, the marginalization of the private sector, the localization of Palestinian politics 
and economy, and the marginalization of the Palestinian refugees and diaspora.104  
Several analyses have connected the authoritarian system created in the oPt with the 
establishment of the PA by the Oslo Process105 and associated international donor aid. 
For Le More,106 donors and diplomats were mainly concerned with establishing a strong 
power structure around Chairman Arafat capable of delivering security and a peace deal 
while reform, good governance and democracy came to the forefront of the donor 
                                                 
102 Alissa, supra note 32, p.140. 
103 Brynen enumerated some of those challenges: the lack of resources and expertise and the unwillingness 
of some Palestinian professionals; the lack of institutionalization mainly due to the emergence of 
bureaucratic structures which became personal power bases enmeshed in competition with each other and 
with preexisting civil society organizations; the unclear demarcation of authority between the remnants of 
the PLO bureaucracy and the emerging power centers of the PA; Arafat's neo-patrimonial management 
style where the Office of the President has retained a role in many projects; the weakness of Palestinian 
private sector in quality and capacity, that was distorted by decades of "de-development" under Israeli 
occupation; the weakness of local infrastructures, such as the transportation, the communication, and the 
energy; the administrative confusion by weak Palestinian institutionalization inhibited the PA's ability to 
formulate and implement economic policy and severally slowed the delivery of assistance; the absence of 
solid project proposals and sufficient procedural guarantees, funds were simply not released; the unclear 
lines of economic authority. Brynen, supra note 33, p.88. 
104 See for example: H. Frisch, Modern Absolutist or Neopatrimoniarchal State Building? Customary Law, 
Extended Families, and the Palestinian Authority, 29 Int. J. Middle East Stud. 341-358 (1997), Fidler, supra 
note 5, Le More, supra note 6, p.981-999, Alissa, supra note 32, pp.123-143. 
105 Alissa, supra note 32, pp.123-143. 
106 Le More, supra note 6, p.993. 
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agenda only in mid-2002. For this reason, the same author concludes, the reform effort 
was conceived as a technocratic exercise aimed at improving –and for some changing- 
the regime.  
Moreover, the PA was conceived as a transient institution, limited spatially and 
circumscribed in the powers it can exercise in the non-continuous areas which it has 
been created to administer. Within this 'client status' context, the PA’s core functions are 
to provide civil and legal administration to the non-refugee population of the WBGS and 
deliver security for the Israelis.107 From this perspective, broader governance towards 
sustainable growth and development is simply beyond the PA’s capacity. 
Part IV: Conclusion  
With all of the PA’s shortcomings, the main challenge to a vital economy in Palestine 
nevertheless remains the occupation. The past few years have witnessed the second 
Palestinian Intifada and, with it, an era in which every aspect of the life of the 
Palestinians deteriorated. GNP declined dramatically; unemployment grew to an 
unprecedented size; and poverty reached very high levels. The fact that the Palestinians 
were working on the improvement of the general economic situation, and in particular 
on reforming the legal and judicial system is worth praising, and the fact that the success 
was limited does not come as a surprise.  
The experience of the last years has confirmed that sustained economic development 
cannot be achieved if all parties ignore international norms. In contravention of these 
norms, a crippling regime of walls, exclusion, population transfer, and expansion of 
settlements has hampered any effort to develop the Palestinian economy. The 
“international community” has failed to play the role of a neutral mediator in this long-
standing conflict. The PA and in consequence the Palestinian population have been faced 
with harsh economic sanctions, that disrupted the supply of vital services, such as health 
and education. International donor activities have not focused on long-term projects, and 
instead an aid-reliant society has been created that can be controlled through economic 
stranglehold whenever its behaviour is not accepted.  
Many international organizations are involved in facilitating the enhancement of the rule 
of law in Palestine and in reforming the legal system. It is important to couple these 
efforts in Palestine with efforts on the international level aiming at enforcing a just 
                                                 
107 Le More, supra note 6, p.986. 
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political solution to the conflict based on international law, thus ending the latter-day 
colonial reality that the Palestinians face. 
